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TOWARDS PRAGMATIC CONSERVATISM: A
REVIEW OF SETH VANNATTA’S
CONSERVATISM AND PRAGMATISM IN LAW,
POLITICS, AND ETHICS
Allen Mendenhall*
At some point all writers come across a book they wish they had
written. Several such books line my bookcases; the latest of which is Seth
Vannatta’s Conservativism and Pragmatism in Law, Politics, and Ethics.1
The two words conservatism and pragmatism circulate widely and
with apparent ease, as if their import were immediately clear and
uncontroversial. But if you press strangers for concise definitions, you will
likely find that the signification of these words differs from person to person.2
Maybe it’s not just that people are unwilling to update their understanding of
conservatism and pragmatism—maybe it’s that they cling passionately to
their understanding (or misunderstanding), fearing that their operative
paradigms and working notions of 20th century history and philosophy will
collapse if conservatism and pragmatism differ from some developed
expectation or ingrained supposition.
I began to immerse myself in pragmatism in graduate school when I
discovered that its central tenets aligned rather cleanly with those of Edmund
Burke, David Hume, F. A. Hayek, Michael Oakeshott, and Russell Kirk, men
widely considered to be on the right end of the political spectrum even if their
ideas diverge in key areas.3 In fact, I came to believe that pragmatism
reconciled these thinkers, that whatever their marked intellectual differences,
these men believed certain things that could be synthesized and organized in
terms of pragmatism.4 I reached this conclusion from the same premise
adopted by Vannatta: “Conservatism and pragmatism[] . . . are methods[] . . .
guided by various common norms.”5 As such, they can lead to different
*
Allen Mendenhall (M.A., J.D., LL.M., Ph.D.) is an Assistant Attorney General in the State of
Alabama Office of the Attorney General, an adjunct professor in the English Department and the
Department of Humanities at Faulkner University, and author of Literature and Liberty: Essays in
Libertarian Literary Criticism (2014). Visit his website at http://www.allenmendenhall.com.
1
SETH VANNATTA, CONSERVATISM AND PRAGMATISM IN LAW, POLITICS, AND ETHICS (2014).
2
Based upon interactions with audiences at lectures and conferences, the reviewer acknowledges this
claim as anecdotal and experiential.
3
VANNATTA, supra note 1, at 5–6, 19, 22–37, 45–47, 50–53, 67, 122–24, 167–77 (discussing Burke);
id. at 6, 23, 34, 44–53, 90, 123, 145–46, 151 (discussing Hume); id. at 7–8, 105, 115, 121–25 (discussing
Hayek); id. at x–xi, 7, 9, 73, 90–96, 106, 162, 180–88, 212–22 (discussing Oakeshott); id. at 22–23, 167–
77, 182, 185, 187 (discussing Kirk).
4
Id. at 2–5.
5
Id. at 2.

Published by eCommons, 2016

46

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

political policies despite the consistently conservative character of their
processes and techniques.6
James M. Albrecht stated in Reconstructing Individualism that
pragmatism is accused of
contradictory sins: it optimistically overestimates the
possibilities for reform, or it succumbs to a conservative
gradualism; it is too committed to a mere, contentless method
of inquiry that undermines the stability of traditional
meanings, or its emphasis on existing means places too much
weight on the need to accommodate existing customs, truths,
and institutions.7
In other words, pragmatism is often reduced to liberalism or
conservatism, overbroad, crude, and simplistic labels that do not aid our
understanding of what pragmatism does or means.8 A little word confusion
is harmless, but what is troubling and problematic is misrepresentation writ
large, the distorting and obscuring of meaning for ideological purposes; when
untutored or dogmatic minds accept as true and unchallengeable wrong ideas
about pragmatism, then pragmatism rightly understood becomes the object of
unwarranted disdain and reprobation.9 Because individuals such as C. S.
Peirce and William James labored to exposit clear, serviceable, and rigorous
theories of pragmatism, the fruit of their efforts should in all fairness be
treated with more than passing derision or partisan reduction.10
6
Allen Mendenhall, Pragmatists versus Agrarians?, U. BOOKMAN (June 1, 2013), http://www.kirkce
nter.org/index.php/bookman/article/pragmatists-versus-agrarians/ (“[T]he pragmatism of Peirce and James
is not about sociopolitical or socioeconomic advancement. It is a methodology, a process of scientific
inquiry. It does not address conservatism per se or liberalism per se. It can lead one to either conservative
or liberal outcomes, although the earliest pragmatists rarely applied it to politics as such. It is, accordingly,
a vehicle to an end, not an end itself.”).
7
JAMES M. ALBRECHT, RECONSTRUCTING INDIVIDUALISM: A PRAGMATIC TRADITION FROM
EMERSON TO ELLISON 17 (1st ed. 2012).
8
Id.; ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON, EVOLUTION AND THE COMMON LAW 104–05, 108 (2005)
(distinguishing between conservative, liberal, and radical pragmatism in a careful manner, which irradiates
this point); Jonah Goldberg, On Pragmatism & Fascism: Part One, NAT’L REV. (Apr. 27, 2009, 10:00
AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/liberal-fascism/203906/pragmatism-fascism-part-one-jonah-goldbe
rg (describing an example of oversimplification of pragmatism as leftist); Peter Berkowitz, Pragmatism
Obama Style: Surprise, it’s Left-Wing, WKLY. STANDARD (May 4, 2009), http://www.weeklystandard.com
/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/016/425yustu.asp?page=1 (overstating pragmatism’s affiliation with the
left in light of Richard Rorty); Rich Lowry, Bob McDonnell, Conservative Pragmatist, NAT’L REV. (Oct.
22, 2009, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/228458/bob-mcdonnell-conservative-pragma
tist-rich-lowry (describing a simplistic attempt at associating pragmatism and conservatism); John Osborn,
Pragmatic Conservatism at the Heart of Chief Justice’s Ruling to Uphold ACA Subsidies, FORBES (June
25, 2015, 12:42 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/johnosborn/2015/06/25/pragmatic-conservatism-at-the
-heart-of-chief-justices-ruling-to-updhold-aca-subsidies/.
9
See generally Thomas Short, The Conservative Pragmatism of Charles Peirce, 43 MOD. AGE 295
(2001) (regarding confusion about the meaning of pragmatism, the association of pragmatism with leftism,
and the danger of misconstruing pragmatism in the vein of Richard Rorty).
10
See, e.g., William James, Pragmatism, in WILLIAM JAMES: WRITINGS 1902–1910 (1987); C. S.
Peirce, Some Consequences of Four Incapacities, 2 J. SPECULATIVE PHIL. 140 (1868); C. S. Peirce, The
Fixation of Belief, 12 POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY 1 (1877); C. S. Peirce, How to Make Our Ideas Clear, 12
POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY 286 (1878); C. S. Peirce, What Pragmatism Is, 15 MONIST. 161 (1905); C. S.
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That has not been the case. Jonah Goldberg, syndicated columnist
and senior editor at National Review, suggests in Liberal Fascism that
“Deweyan Pragmatism” was peopled by men and women who not only “laid
the intellectual groundwork of the New Deal and the welfare state” but also
“thought that fascism sounded like a pretty good idea.”11 Goldberg implied
that Dewey’s wartime zeal was a pretext for socialism,12 suggested that
Dewey’s travels to the Soviet Union linked him to Bolshevism,13 associated
pragmatism with a Nietzschean “call for overturning all traditional
morality,”14 trumpeted the fact that Mussolini read and admired William
James,15 scorned the “progressive-pragmatic tradition of William James and
John Dewey,”16 and in various ways attempted to link Dewey, James, and
pragmatism with fascism, police surveillance, statist progressivism, and the
warrior spirit.17 Goldberg listed facts and then announced conclusions,
chapter after chapter and page after page, skipping over any inconvenient
analysis or careful, constant methodology and scribbling away like a zealous
teenager lost in the rhizomes of Wikipedia, clicking from entry to entry and
moving seamlessly through the mediated wisdom of the Internet, excited to
be exploring serious ideas for the first time.18
Goldberg’s lack of scholarly method and credibility is well
PEIRCE, PRAGMATISM AS A PRINCIPLE AND METHOD OF RIGHT THINKING: THE 1903 HARVARD LECTURES
ON PRAGMATISM (Patricia Ann Turrisi ed., 1997); C. S. Peirce, Issues of Pragmaticism, 15 MONIST 481
(1905); CHARLES SANDERS PIERCE, 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PIERCE: PRAGMATISM
AND PRAGMATICISM (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1931). For representative work by Peirce
and James on pragmatism, see William James, Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results, 1 U.
CHRON. 287 (1898).
11
JONAH GOLDBERG, LIBERAL FASCISM: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LEFT FROM
MUSSOLINI TO THE POLITICS OF MEANING 9 (2007).
12
Id. at 106–07.
13
Id. at 102.
14
Id. at 107.
15
Id. at 51.
16
Id. at 168.
17
Id. at 28, 37, 51, 94, 98, 102, 106, 117, 149, 157, 176, 337, 423.
18
The theory of the rhizome comes from GILLES DELEUZE & FELIX GUATTARI, A THOUSAND
PLATEAUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (Brian Massumi trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1987). For
some of Goldberg’s breezy, categorical, and sweeping claims, see GOLDBERG, supra note 11, at 1 (referring
to the character types “[a]ngry left-wingers” and “corporate fat cats” as fascist without specifying actual
people who meet this description). Id. at 5–6 (implying that pragmatism was militaristic and thus appealed
to Mussolini, associating Nazism with Afrocentrism, and accusing unspecified leftists of conflating
Zionism and Nazism); id. at 9–10 (accusing the American left of adopting Italian fascism while Stalin rose
to power, supporting Stalinism and Nazism); id. at 38–43 (discussing the alleged fascism of the French
Revolution as a precursor to fascism during World War I); id. at 53–77 (comparing Hitler and Nazism to
the American left); id. at 82–93 (discussing Woodrow Wilson, progressivism, Nazism, Christianity, Teddy
Roosevelt, Darwin, evolution, the Republican Party, and nationalism); id. at 93–106 (attributing supposed
fascism in America to the teachings of Nietzsche and William James and claiming that American
progressives demonstrated an affection for Nazi Germany and Italian fascism); id. at 238–40 (suggesting
that the Civil Rights Movement and liberal reforms of the 1960s led to fascist street riots, increased rights
to criminals, and “the pre-fascist logic of the Bismarckian welfare state”); id. at 243–83 (linking the
contemporary American left to racism, eugenics, Nazism, jingoism, xenophobia, and the Ku Klux Klan);
id. at 392 (referring to unnamed “smug, liberal know-nothings, sublimely confident of the truth of their illinformed prejudices,” without naming those alleged prejudices); id. at 397–99 (suggesting that Patrick
Buchanan leaned toward leftist fascism rather than populist conservatism).
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documented,19 but the reach of his influence extends far, especially, if not
exclusively, within conservative circles.20 Liberal Fascism hit the top spot on
the New York Times Bestseller List in 2008, and Goldberg continues to churn
out articles for popular media that recycle comically misguided and
dangerously absurd notions of philosophical pragmatism.21 A different
narrative unfolds in the hands of a gentle, meticulous scholar. Vannatta, an
associate professor of philosophy at Morgan State University who has no axe
to grind and no agenda to push, doesn’t name names, but he must have had
people like Goldberg in mind when he wrote about “the incoherence of the
conservatism referred to by the media and by the disconnection of the
everyday meaning of pragmatism from its philosophical origins . . . .” 22
Vannatta does not hector readers with refutations of Goldberg (and similar
critics) whose claims about pragmatism should not be taken seriously except
as objects of study in their own right, i.e., as evidence of what is wrong in the
marketplace of conservative letters. The political right should take note of
Vannatta’s book, however, because, in his words, “conservatives would
benefit by looking more closely at the work of the classical American
pragmatists.”23
Why? Where do pragmatism and conservatism intersect? What does
19
See, e.g., David Neiwert, Jonah Goldberg’s Bizarro History, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 8, 2008), https://p
rospect.org/article/jonah-goldbergs-bizarro-history-0; Austin Bramwell, Goldberg’s Trivial Pursuit, AM.
CONSERVATIVE (Jan. 28, 2008), http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/goldbergs-trivial-pursu
it/; Eric Alterman, Conservative Cannibalism, NATION (Feb. 21, 2008), http://www.thenation.com/article/c
onservative-cannibalism; David Oshinsky, Heil Woodrow!, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 30, 2007), http://www.nytim
es.com/2007/12/30/books/review/Oshinsky-t.html; Michael Tomasky, Jackboots and Whole Foods, NEW
REPUBLIC (Mar. 12, 2008), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/books/jackboots-and-whole-foods; David
Gordon, Fascism, Left and Right, MISES DAILY (Jan. 31, 2008), https://mises.org/library/fascism-left-andright#_ftnref2.
20
The National Review, for which Goldberg is editor-at-large, had a total, paid, and verified circulation
of 137,681 as of December 31, 2014, according to the Alliance for Audited Media. Total Circ. for
Consumer Magazines, ALLIANCE FOR AUDITED MEDIA (Dec. 31, 2014), http://abcas3.auditedmedia.com/e
circ/magtitlesearch.asp. Goldberg is a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. See Jonah Goldberg,
AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.aei.org/scholar/jonah-goldberg/. He is also a New
York Times Bestselling Author. See Best Sellers, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/be
st-sellers-books/2012-05-27/hardcover-nonfiction/list.html.
21
To be fair, Goldberg demonstrates occasional cautiousness in Liberal Fascism. For example, he
states,
The relationship between Pragmatism and conservatism is a bit more complicated.
William James was a great American philosopher, and there is much in his work
that conservatives admire. And if by Pragmatism you simply mean realism or
practicality, then there are a great many conservative pragmatists. But if by
Pragmatism one means the constellation of theories swirling among the progressives
or the work of John Dewey, then conservatives have been at the forefront of a
century-long critique of Pragmatism. However, it should be said that both James and
Dewey are thoroughly American philosophers whose influence in a wide range of
matters defies neat categorization along the left-right axis.
GOLDBERG, supra note 11, at 434 n.22. That he relegates this caution to a footnote, leaving the more
tendentious passages for the text proper, suggests a willingness to sacrifice academic rigor for commercial
success. Such a willingness is not bad in itself, but it does problematize Goldberg’s claims by undermining
his credibility. The existence of this footnote raises the specter of ghost authorship or editorial intervention
because it so glaringly contradicts Goldberg’s dogged attempts to link James and Dewey to fascism.
22
VANNATTA, supra note 1, at 1.
23
Id. at 4.
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pragmatism offer conservatives?
First, Vannatta argues that, as a
methodology, pragmatism concerns itself with the situated, the embedded, the
contextual, the experiential, the fallible, the social, and the customary.24 Chief
among its concerns are lived experience, which parallels conservative
skepticism regarding “rationalism in ethics, politics, and law”25 (the target of
Oakeshott’s philosophy);26 an eschewal of “the false universalism of a priori
thinking” and a turn towards “localized, contextual, and experiential
inquiry”;27 and a concentration on the aesthetic dimensions of experience, as
exemplified in the works of Burke, Hume, and Kirk.28 Like the pragmatist,
“[t]he conservative attends to custom, habit, experience, even prejudice, not
first principles, in moral, political, and legal inquiries.”29
Second, conservatives and pragmatists are “attendant to the temporal
and historical dimensions of our collective experience” and “emphasize the
way historical inquiry intrudes upon and is a necessary part of moral, legal,
and political questions.”30 This facet of conservatism is linked with a
hesitance to embrace grand abstractions, totalizing metanarratives, and fixed
teleology as sound calculi for centrally planning institutions and for directing
human behavior using the coercive mechanisms of government.31 This facet
of conservatism is also expressed in Kirk’s fourth canon of conservative
thought: “Faith in prescription and distrust of ‘sophisters, calculators, and
economists’ who would reconstruct society upon abstract designs. Custom,
convention, and old prescription are checks both upon man’s anarchic
impulse and upon the innovator’s lust for power.”32 Despite his famous
disclaiming of conservatism,33 Hayek followed Kirk in opposing “Cartesian
rationalism”34 and entered into Kirk’s cognitive and discursive field,
promoting in The Constitution of Liberty “a modest and even humble creed,
based on a low opinion of men’s wisdom and capacities and aware that within
the range for which we can plan, even the best society will not satisfy all our
desires.”35 Hayek acknowledged “the fact that man’s mind is itself a product
of the civilization in which he has grown up and that it is unaware of much of
the experience which has shaped it—experience that assists it by being
embodied in the habits, conventions, language, and moral beliefs which are
24
Id. at x, 2–3, 6, 8–9, 17, 23, 33, 41, 45, 50, 52–53, 61–62, 67, 76, 81–82, 85, 88–89, 93, 97–98, 100,
105–06, 115, 117, 120, 123–25, 151, 156, 162, 164, 173, 175, 179, 187, 191, 200, 202, 207, 210, 213–19,
222, 247.
25
Id. at 3.
26
See generally MICHAEL OAKESHOTT, RATIONALISM IN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 5–42 (1991).
27
VANNATTA, supra note 1, at 3.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 2, 6–8, 23–24, 28–29, 34–35, 42, 53, 65, 98, 106–07, 120, 124–25, 161, 164, 168, 172, 184–
85, 187, 190–91, 201, 204, 207, 209, 220, 222.
32
RUSSELL KIRK, THE CONSERVATIVE MIND: FROM BURKE TO ELIOT 9 (7th rev. ed. 1995).
33
See F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 519–33 (11th ed. 2011).
34
Id. at 110.
35
Id. at 54.

Published by eCommons, 2016

50

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1

part of its makeup.”36 Accordingly, Hayek was a pragmatic conservative who
realized that custom and experience shaped but did not determine the political
and ethical beliefs of a social network or community.37
Conservatism defies ready definition or easy explanation because,
Vannatta says, echoing Oakeshott, “conservatism” is a “disposition.”38
Vannatta qualifies that “conservatism can be cashed out politically,
religiously, socially, and economically without a univocal meaning,” since
conservatives of different stripes have at various times “advocated preserving
all types of political structures, religious institutions, and economic
relationships.”39 Conservatism is not a cookie-cutter template or a ten-step
program but a complex field of operation and mode of thought in which
human activity is held to established standards and subject to modest and
workable adjustments in keeping with changed circumstances. Vannatta
makes it clear that the conservatism he implements and advances for purposes
of his argument has little to do with politicians, political parties, and partisan
gamesmanship that place a premium on vote tallies and sound bites.40 Readers
looking for validations of the antics and optics of Fox News and the activities
and policies of the Republican Party should consult a different book.
Vannatta has arranged this work in three parts divided into chapters.
The two chapters that make up Part I provided much of the context for the rest
of the book, outlining in broad strokes the relationship between conservatism
and pragmatism and comparing the thought of such figures as Burke, Hume,
Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Paine, Kant, Bentham, and Mill.41 Vannatta
revealed in Part I that pragmatist teachings are redolent of the political
doctrines of restraint and rootedness and of experiential and practical
knowledge against abstract and utopian projection.42 If conservatism inheres
in the manifest tendencies of social communities for forming habits, patterns,
customs, and institutions, then pragmatism is conservative by responding and
deferring to these tendencies rather than stamping them out or dismissing
36
Id. at 75. For more on Hayek and pragmatism, see Richard Posner’s summary of Hayek’s
jurisprudence. Richard A. Posner, Kelsen versus Hayek: Pragmatism, Economics, and Democracy, in LAW,
PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 250, 250–91 (2003).
37
VANNATTA, supra note 1, at 121–25.
38
Id. at 2; see also OAKESHOTT, supra note 26, at 168 (Opening his essay, Oakeshott writes, “[m]y
theme is not a creed or a doctrine, but a disposition. To be conservative is to be disposed to think and
behave in certain manners; it is to prefer certain kinds of conduct and certain conditions of human
circumstances to others; it is to be disposed to make certain kinds of choices. And my design here is to
construe this disposition as it appears in contemporary character, rather than to transpose it into the idiom
of general principles”).
39
VANNATTA, supra note 1, at 2.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 22–37 (discussing Burke); id. at 44–46 (discussing Hume); id. at 13–15, 18–19, 33 (discussing
Hobbes); id. at 13–23, 25 (discussing Locke); id. at 15–19, 21, 23, 26 (discussing Rousseau); id. at 19–22
(discussing Paine); id. at 17–19, 42–43 (discussing Kant); id. at 39–41 (discussing Bentham); id. at 41–42
(discussing Mill).
42
See generally id. at 23–53. Vannatta develops the anti-utopian characteristics of pragmatism and
conservatism later in the book. See, e.g., id. at 64, 73, 184, 190–91, 195, 199, 201, 206, 215.
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them out of hand. History and tradition are indispensable to the pragmatic
mindset.43 Pragmatic conservatism is free of foregone conclusions and
unyielding doctrinal restrictions; it is open to revision, skeptical of abstract
platitudes, and marked by historicism and inquiry. Burke and Hume are
perhaps the best representatives of what conservative pragmatism looks like
in the context of political theory. George Santayana, a figure who rounded
out early versions of Kirk’s Conservative Mind, stands as an icon for the
marriage of the conservative tradition of Burke and Hume with pragmatism’s
focus on synthetic systems of communal inquiry, practical dependence on the
knowledge of our predecessors, and functional principles of synechism or
historical continuity.44
Part II mapped the concept of history and historical inquiry as it has
descended from thinker to thinker in the pragmatist canon, as it were, and
traces an index of influence, from science to positivism to postmodernism or
neopragmatism, from which and for which pragmatist historicism and
historiography have been put to work.45 Part III, however, is the most
important section for students and practitioners of the law because it accents
the legal elements of pragmatism and describes their significance to commonlaw adjudication. Justice Holmes is a pivotal force here.46 My own work has
substantiated Vannatta’s claim that “Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. shows us
how pragmatism and conservatism intersect methodologically with respect to
legal theory and practice.”47 My enthusiasm for Vannatta’s take on Holmes
stems, in part, from my concurrence with his contention that “Holmes, in his
reaction against formalism in legal theory, applied Peirce’s pragmatism”; that
“Holmes’s moral philosophy revealed the sentimentalism and skepticism of
rationalism resonant in the work of Hume and Burke”; and that Holmes’s
“judicial theory was governed by pragmatism’s conservative norms.”48
Vannatta highlights the resemblance of Holmes’s jurisprudence with
43
Id. at 51 (“Insofar as we inherit the dictates of morality naturally and unreflectively from the past,
we should not cut ties with the past. Without this inheritance, Peirce tells us we are left only to be victims
of our passions. But his warning is not against the influence of passions in morality, but rather the severing
of morality from the past by reason. Reason, as we have seen in the radicalism of Paine, cares nothing for
the past, which has no right to bind us. But as we saw in Burke’s prescient warnings about revolutionary
innovations in government founded on the abstractions of reason, cutting ties to past inheritance can cause
us to be victim to the passions of the day.”).
44
Id. at 49.
45
See generally id. at 57–101.
46
See generally id. at 126–44.
47
Id. at 126. For my discussion of Holmes and conservatism, see Allen Mendenhall, Justice Holmes
and Conservatism, 17 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 305 (2013). For my work on Holmes and pragmatism, see
Allen Mendenhall, Pragmatism on the Shoulders of Emerson: Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.’s Jurisprudence
as a Synthesis of Emerson, Peirce, James, and Dewey, 48 S.C. REV. (2015). See Allen Mendenhall, Oliver
Wendell Holmes Jr. is the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist: A Brief and Belated Response to Stanley
Cavell, 6 FAULKNER L. REV. 197 (2014); see also Allen Mendenhall, Dissent as a Site of Aesthetic
Adaptation in the Work of Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., 1 BRITISH J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 517 (2012); Allen
Mendenhall, Holmes and Dissent, 12 J. JURIS. 679 (2011).
48
VANNATTA, supra note 1, at 126.
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Peirce’s pragmatism, and in particular with Peirce’s conception of truth.49
Holmes was a pragmatist, Vannatta explains, because:
[He] reasoned from the particulars of experience toward
general principles, rejecting the purely formal deduction of
conclusions from formal propositions. He was skeptical of
invoking as universal a priori premises to begin his
arguments. His concept of truth[] . . . echo[ed] Peirce’s
description of truth as the opinion to be held by an indefinite
amount of communal inquiry. . . . [H]e avoided appeals to
moral principles too far removed from our experience. His
ethical principles were contingent, reflecting one’s cultural
conditions, and emerging from the felt problems of one’s
environment.50
Finally, “the meaning of his moral principles, the meaning of legal
principles such as rights and duties, and the meaning of law itself are to be
found in their effects, or in the prediction of their effects.”51 Yet Holmes also
“echoes Burke as he allows for manners, an aesthetic category, to take the
form of duty and act as the counterbalance for the darker side of the
evolutionary life struggle” of humans seeking to achieve the type of world
they wish to live in.52 Much ink has been spilled over Holmes’s pragmatism,
but Vannatta’s chapters on Holmes are valuable, concise introductions to the
subject, offering a more philosophically demanding counterpart to Louis
Menand’s biographical treatment of Holmes and pragmatism in The
Metaphysical Club.53
Arguing that “a conservative norm governs the manner in which we
undergo and prescribe reform,”54 Vannatta finds himself in accord with
Albrecht, who asserted that “pragmatism’s enduring political appeal lies
precisely in its balanced insistence on both the possibility and difficulty of
reform—a balance that, again, reflects the mutually transforming interaction
between human nature and its environing conditions posited by a pluralistic
model of experience.”55 Albrecht tracked such pluralism to the political
thought of William James, stating, “A pluralistic universe is one in which
human ideas and actions can help realize new possibilities, but such
possibilities must emerge from existing conditions and overcome the inertia
of existing customs and institutions.”56 This line recalls Kirk’s conservative

49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56

Id. at 112–14, 126–28, 132, 135, 137–39, 141, 143, 164, 217.
Id. at 127–28.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 149.
See generally LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB (1st ed. 2001).
VANNATTA, supra note 1, at 3.
ALBRECHT, supra note 7, at 17.
Id.
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approach to reform as set out in his sixth canon of conservatism:
Recognition that change may not be salutary reform: hasty
innovation may be a devouring conflagration, rather than a
torch of progress. Society must alter, for prudent change is
the means of social preservation; but a statesman must take
Providence into his calculations, and a statesman’s chief
virtue, according to Plato and Burke, is prudence.57
Without referencing Providence, but also without denying or refusing
Providence, Vannatta rearticulates Kirk’s vision in terms of “the ontological
conservatism of nature,” which transforms institutions “as organisms
transform themselves – not all at once.”58 Change is important for
conservatives, in other words, but it must be gradual, incremental, and
imitative and carried out through tested and tried practices and
methodologies, attentive to our human capacity for error and miscalculation.59
According to Hayek, “no statement of an ideal that is likely to sway men’s
minds can be complete: it must be adapted to a given climate of opinion,
presuppose much that is accepted by all men of the time, and illustrate general
principles in terms of issues with which they are concerned.”60 Hayek
recognizes that “we must always strive to improve our institutions” even if
“we can never aim to remake them as a whole . . . .”61
In my view, these points are so basic and obvious that to insist on
them seems superfluous as a matter of argumentation. As a matter of strategy
and tactical scope, however, Vannatta is right to reiterate the already apparent,
underscoring the leading theories of Burke, Hume, and Hayek.62 In light of
the inflammatory portrayals of pragmatism that proliferate in conservative
magazines and journals (a problem that extends beyond Goldberg), Vannatta
must overcompensate to serve as an effective corrective.63 This reviewer is
KIRK, supra note 32, at 9.
VANNATTA, supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 3, 10, 25, 85, 91, 113, 137, 166, 173–74, 183, 185, 211, 213, 217.
60
HAYEK, supra note 33, at 47.
61
Id. at 124.
62
See VANNATTA, supra note 1, at 22–37 (discussing Burke); id. at 44–46 (discussing Hume); id. at
7–8, 121–24 (discussing Hayak).
63
See Pat Buchanan, The Obama Doctrine, CREATORS, http://www.creators.com/opinion/pat-buchan
an/the-obama-doctrine-e91da58d41.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2016) (“Obama is in that tradition of
ruthless American pragmatism,” which includes breaking foreign policy ties with traditional allies of the
United States); see also Matthew Continetti, A Ruthless Pragmatism, WKLY. STANDARD (Apr. 29, 2009,
11:47 AM), http://www.weeklystandard.com/weblogs/TWSFP/2009/04/a_ruthless_pragmatism_1.asp?pa
ge=1# (implying that President Obama’s championing of the Affordable Care Act was pragmatic); Paul
Mirengoff, A Pragmatic Heresy, WKLY. STANDARD (Feb. 8, 2006), http://www.weeklystandard.com/Cont
ent/Public/Articles/000/000/006/687lbmqo.asp (associating pragmatism with the National Center for
Neighborhood Enterprise). These examples use the term “pragmatism” in a way that is foreign to the
classical pragmatism of C.S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. For additional examples of incorrect
or negative portrayals of pragmatism in conservative publications or by conservative authors, see Jonah
Goldberg, A Pragmatic Look at Obama’s Pragmatism, TOWNHALL (Sept. 30, 2009), http://townhall.com/c
olumnists/jonahgoldberg/2009/09/30/a_pragmatic_look_at_obamas_pragmatism/page/full
(treating Obama as a pragmatist because he allegedly changed his mind about the War in Afghanistan).
57
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unaware of any standing refutations of Vannatta from a conservative
perspective. Those may materialize in due course if his book is given the
attention and publicity it deserves. I do not mean to underrate the importance
and effectiveness of what Vannatta has accomplished merely to point out that
his impressive argument will invite opposition as all impressive arguments
do.
If there is a drawback it is that Vannatta neglects to expound on the
decisive role of William James in guiding pragmatist methodology,64 but the
pragmatist canon is too wide and intricate for each member to receive
worthwhile treatment in a book that covers such a broad range. Still, James
is an early progenitor of pragmatism, second behind only Peirce, and to give
him short shrift seems shortsighted, especially in view of his relationship with
and influence on pragmatists like Holmes, who figure prominently in
Vannatta’s argument.65
Vannatta has achieved the signal merit of instantiating the practices
he describes. He shows himself to be a pragmatist even as he writes critically
about pragmatism.66 “We proceed in our inquiries as meliorists,” he says,
“whose hope is checked by a healthy skepticism and a realization of the tragic
shortfalls of . . . conservative progress.”67 This account of pragmatic
conservatism emphasizes “the way our social knowledge is distended
temporally, inherited through habit, custom, and tradition, but fallible and
thus capable of reconstruction through inquiry guided by embodied and social
intelligence, not just abstract reason.”68 Thus conceived, pragmatic
conservatism is not a refractory enterprise or a closed system of belief. It is
perfectly in keeping with Albrecht’s proposition that pragmatism offers a
balanced view of the possibilities for reforming human
nature, affirming that our most primal human impulses can
be trained and redirected into new habits, while also insisting
that the task of education is daunting—that remaking
personality requires a commitment to reforming the full
range of social conditions that shape the habits of character.69
Albrecht might prefer the term moderate to conservative if forced to
assign categories. He remarks, for instance, “In stressing the plasticity and
64
VANNATTA, supra note 1, at 127 (acknowledging that, Vannatta states, “Conservativism and
Pragmatism does not read pragmatism through the lens of William James”). Therefore, the inattention to
James is not a result of oversight.
65
Vannatta is careful to distinguish Holmes and James. Id. at 126–27.
66
Id. at 223.
67
Id. (explaining the author’s use of the first-person plural “we,” Vannatta appears to include himself
among the conservative pragmatists: “We produce data showing problems, and we generate works of art
which stir the emotions and call humanity to a consciousness of social ills and sympathy for its victims.
We proceed in our inquiries as meliorists, whose hope is checked by a healthy skepticism and a realization
of the tragic shortfalls of such conservative progress”).
68
Id. at 106.
69
ALBRECHT, supra note 7, at 17.
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educability of human impulses and habits, the value of pragmatism lies—as
it typically does—in avoiding the opposing extremes of more absolutist or
essentialist visions.”70 But isn’t this the kind and degree of moderation that
illustrates the conservative disposition of Burke and Oakeshott? One recalls
Dewey’s dictum that “the new idea must be generated out of the old”71 and
Emerson’s maxim that “the new in art is always formed out of the old,”72
statements of reform that recommend history and tradition as guiding forces
for human action.
Conservatism and Pragmatism in Law, Politics, and Ethics is the
most definitive treatment of pragmatism and conservatism to date. It
neutralizes inflammatory and misleading accounts, such as Goldberg’s, that
are more about indictment and accusation than accuracy or context. The term
pragmatism and its associations have undergone so much damage and
debasement that their connection to methodological and dispositional
conservatism might have been lost to everyone but diligent scholars.73
Vannatta has only begun the process of recovering a proper understanding of
pragmatic conservatism. Besides James, he neglects work on Santayana, who
identified as “the luckless American who is born a conservative”;74 Clarence
Irving Lewis, who reportedly quipped, “I am an intelligent liberal – that is to
say, a conservative”;75 and Sidney Hook, who rounded out his career as a
fellow at the conservative Hoover Institution at Stanford University.76 There
Id.
John Dewey, An Introductory Word, in THE METAPHYSICS OF PRAGMATISM 1 (1927).
72
Ralph Waldo Emerson, Essay XII: Art, in ESSAYS AND LECTURES 431 (Joel Porte ed., 1983).
73
See generally SIDNEY HOOK, PRAGMATISM AND THE TRAGIC SENSE OF LIFE ix (1974) (citing from
the author’s introduction: “The strange notion prevails among those who misread Peirce and Dewey that
because any assertion of fact or value may be challenged to submit its credentials to further test, we
therefore can possess no firm knowledge about anything. Equally bizarre is the assumption that the
experimentalist believes that we can or should experiment in human affairs in the same manner or with the
same methods and techniques employed in the natural sciences”). See id. at ix–x (correcting a prevailing
misunderstanding about the pragmatic notion of truth: “Technically, pragmatism was developed as a theory
of meaning and then as a theory of truth. In its broadest sense as a philosophy of life, it holds that the logic
and ethics of scientific method can and should be applied to human affairs. This implies that one can make
warranted assertions about values as well as facts. It recognizes that the differences in the subject matter
of values requires the use of different methods of inquiry, discovery, and test in ascertaining objective
knowledge about them. Most daring and controversial of all, pragmatism holds that it is possible to gain
objective knowledge not only about the best means available to achieve given ends—something freely
granted—but also about the best ends in the problematic situations in which the ends are disputed or
become objects of conflict”); see also Susan Haack, Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect, in
RORTY & PRAGMATISM: THE PHILOSOPHER RESPONDS TO HIS CRITICS 126–47 (Herman J. Saatkamp, Jr.
ed., 1995). For a more recent denunciation of the distorted forms of pragmatism espoused by Richard
Rorty, see Susan Haack, Vulgar Rortyism, in 16 THE NEW CRITERION 67 (1997).
74
GEORGE SANTAYANA, ET AL., THE GENTEEL TRADITION IN AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY AND
CHARACTER AND OPINION IN THE UNITED STATES xxiv (James Seaton ed., 2009).
75
CHARLES HARTSHORNE, THE DARKNESS AND THE LIGHT 307 (1990).
76
See generally CHRISTOPHER PHELPS, YOUNG SIDNEY HOOK: MARXIST AND PRAGMATIST 2
(Cornell Univ. Press ed., 2005) (“Hook spent the Reagan years as a senior research fellow at one of the
country’s two top conservative think tanks, the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace in
Stanford, California, where his files grew thick with complimentary letters from such high-ranking Reagan
officials as William Bennett, Pat Buchanan, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, Lynne Cheney, and Edwin Meese, as
well as foreign policy hawks Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski. Ronald Reagan himself sent warm
greetings for Hook’s eightieth birthday party in 1982 and a holiday card in 1984.”).
70
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is more labor to be done in Vannatta’s wake, but Vannatta must be credited
for nudging the conversation back within the appropriate sphere and for
elevating the discourse about pragmatism back to the plane of sense and
civility. If conservative interest in pragmatism grows, as it should and
probably will, then Vannatta will be at least partially responsible.
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